ABSTRACT
In a typically generous and illuminating essay on Critical Theory, William Connolly acknowledges that ‘every contemporary social theorist must eventually confront the thought of Jürgen Habermas’ (Connolly, 1987: 52). Surely the same must now be said about Connolly’s thought, as his work not only problematizes the leading currents of contemporary theory, but also tackles issues that are actively forgotten or deferred by mainstream perspectives. Not only do his writings persistently engage with the new challenges that punctuate the discourse of political theory, rather than pretending or hoping that these marginal murmurings were simply not there, but he refuses to be confined to any one available idiom or style of reasoning. Instead, he joyously relays between different camps, straddling the so-called analytical and continental divide, or the division between scientists, normativists and intepretivists, where he is happy to converse with thinkers in contiguous fields of thought, even those that are seemingly uncongenial for critical political theory. At first glance, the sheer vitality and scope of Connolly’s work seem to defy
meaningful engagement within the space of a single essay. But this worry is not fatal, as there are numerous arcs and trajectories in his writings and these lines of affinity are brimming with ‘surplus energies’ (Connolly, 2004a: 342). One such line of flight is his ongoing encounter with the philosophy of natural and social science, especially with respect to questions of explanation and critique. Stretching back to his initial engagement with the ‘problem of ideology’ in mainstream American political science in the mid-1960s, right up to the publication of Pluralism in 2005, Connolly has consistently grappled with the scientific ideals embedded in political theorizing, where he has sought to carve out a legitimate alternative to lawlike, teleological, and ideographic forms of explanation.1
