ABSTRACT
The Air Force had an easier time in the 1990s than the other services. The astounding success of Desert Storm brought greatly increased respect for airpower as a component in warfare. In addition, the technologies thought to be central to a “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA) – stealth, precision munitions, more effective communications – were all close to the service’s existing core concerns. So it was much easier to shape the utilization of these technologies to existing Air Force organizational interests, producing evolution rather than transformation. However, Desert Storm was supposed to be only the beginning of the new era of airpower dominance. It has not worked out that way. Each combat experience since 1991 has brought more constraints and complications than Desert Storm did, and the Air Force today is as perplexed by counterinsurgency as the rest of the American military. Throughout this period, the Air Force has sought to continue the massive modernization campaign of all its major platforms that began during the Reagan era. Many of these choices were only distantly related to national strategic needs, but the budget process has been the only constraint. This tension will continue as the service seeks tens of billions dollars for the F-22 and F-35 fighters, which now look to many like the continuation of Cold War thinking rather than effective transformation.
