ABSTRACT
In this chapter we explore the implications of guided learning theory for schooling. Kirschner, Sweller, and Clark (2006) propose a theory of learning based on cognitive-load theory that stresses the limits of working memory. Because of these known limits on human memory, learners need forms of guidance that minimize memory load during instruction. This theory of learning led Kirschner et al. to embrace direct instruction as the most effective pedagogy for schooling. Although guidance may be extremely important for effective instruction, we differ with Kirschner and colleagues in their assertions that inquiry-focused instruction is necessarily unguided and that direct instruction is the only way to provide guidance in schools. Kirschner et al. are silent on some of the most important challenges of schooling. In particular, they do not explicitly attend to three schooling issues that teachers, administrators, and communities must regularly grapple with: how to motivate students; how instruction needs to be sensitive to the particular social contexts in which instruction unfolds; and how instruction should be consistent with the larger purposes of schooling such as, for example, supporting the development of a scientifically informed citizenry. Without addressing these elements of schooling, the fundamental insights about the importance of guidance in learning may be lost to the world of school practice. To advance the discussion of guided learning theory and its implications for instruction, we will examine ways in which this theory can be reconceptualized and applied to some of these core issues of schooling. We hope our discussion can contribute to clarifying the role that guided learning theory can play in building comprehensive instructional regimes (Cohen, Raudenbush, & Ball, 2003; Lagemann, 2002; Raudenbush, 2005) that are more likely to have an impact on practice in schools. Kirschner et al. argue that forms of instruction that have variously been labeled inquiry-and problem-based are not and do not seek to be “guided.” We disagree. In the domain in which we work, science education, there have been numerous and sustained efforts to design learning environments that are inquiry-focused and work to provide significant guidance to learners. We agree
that guidance is critically important to the actions of both learners and, as we will argue, teachers. However, it does not follow from this insight that schools should be limited to direct instructional methods and curricula. We believe inquiry instruction can be guided and still promote the kind of learning and engagement intended by its designers. One key goal of the chapter is to broaden the notion of guidance so that guidance can be better contextualized in instructional routines and tools. Kirschner et al.’s description of guidance is likely too constrained to have a broad impact on instruction in schools. To become useful in schools, any instructional program needs to address some of the core needs and goals of learners and teachers in classrooms. To do so means that, at a minimum, the purposes of schools, student motivation, and the social contexts of instruction should be addressed by the proposed instructional program. These core elements of schooling need to be better accounted for in the discussion of guidance in learning, particularly when Kirschner et al. propose that inquiry instruction should be abandoned. Toward the end of this chapter, we use an example from our own work that we think demonstrates that instruction can be both inquiry-oriented and highly guided. We begin with a description of some of the key elements of the theory of guidance in learning described by Kirschner et al. and their entailments, as we understand them. Kirschner and colleagues argue that human cognitive architecture and, specifically, the architecture of long-term memory, is now sufficiently understood so as to “provide us with the ultimate justification for instruction. The aim of all instruction is to alter long-term memory” (Kirschner et al., 2006, p. 77). They also claim that evidence from empirical studies over the last decades indicates that minimally guided instruction (whether inquiry, project-based, discovery, etc.) is less effective based on learning outcomes than more guided instruction. Therefore, instructional regimes that offer little guidance to students should be abandoned. Another criticism of minimally guided instruction is that instructional designers have misguidedly equated the goals of learning with the means. For example, Kirschner et al. note that many science programs encourage students to engage in open-ended investigations so as to mimic the work of scientists. They deem this approach, in which students discover the problems they want to study as well as the relevant variables of interest to any particular problem, to be in conflict with what is now known about human cognitive architecture. They warn that the epistemology of science should not be the basis of the pedagogy by which students are taught about science. Methodologically, they argue that only randomized, controlled experiments provide useful evidence about the effectiveness of instruction and that any evidence, if it exists, for the efficacy of minimally guided instruction in learning fails to meet this standard. Finally, they assert that it is the burden of those who advocate for minimally guided programs to explain how such programs are not in conflict with what is known about human cognitive architecture. Though we will not provide an extended discussion of all aspects of the argument, we next want to analyze and clarify certain key ideas that will be discussed throughout the chapter. Guidance, as others have pointed out, remains somewhat unclear from the discussion to date (Koedinger & Aleven, 2007; Wise &
O’Neill, Chapter 5, this volume). For Kirschner et al., it appears that guidance means something like using worked-out examples in learning. Also, guidance likely translates into direct instruction with minimal “searching of the problem space” by students, which is thought to put an undue burden on working memory. Kirschner et al. are better able to describe and critique minimally guided instructional programs than they are able to provide details about the pedagogical features of a “maximally” guided instructional regime in school settings. For example, Koedinger and Aleven (2007) point out that the work cited by Kirschner and colleagues is not precise enough in describing when, and under what circumstances, more guidance or assistance should be provided to learners. An important goal of this chapter is to think more deeply about what guidance means in schools, not just for students but also teachers. We also want to explore ways in which the concept of guidance can be expanded to address the motivational and social-contextual challenges of schools in more coherent and instructionally practicable regimes.
