ABSTRACT

The insurgencies in Nagaland and Mizoram in the state of Assam were India’s first experiences with separatist insurgency. They required an untested government and military to adapt to a form of political warfare with which they had little experience. Through trial and error, India developed an approach to political violence in the Northeast that would guide its response to future insurgencies. In particular, the northeastern experience highlights the critical role played by a government’s legitimacy in winning popular support, as well as the need for dissatisfied elites to realize their ambitions by working within, not against, the existing political system. India’s approach was also characterized by nation building and bolstering governing capabilities in under-administered areas. Lessons from India’s confrontation with ethnic-based insurgencies in Nagaland and Mizoram have applicability for U.S. allies that face similar threats, such as Thailand (Pattani United Liberation Organization) and Pakistan (Baluchistan National Liberation Front). For the United States, reflecting on India’s experience with counterinsurgency

(COIN) provides an opportunity to draw lessons from a fellow democracy’s experience in “small wars.” This opportunity is important because a 2005 RAND study emphasized the organizational tendency within the U.S. military to not absorb historical lessons when engaging in COIN operations (RANDCorporation 2005: 7). This chapter is organized into four sections. The first section focuses on the

insurgent organizations, emphasizing the motives of the armed groups and cleavages between the insurgents and their supporters. The second section explores political aspects of the Indian COIN efforts in the Northeast, including the provision of a non-violent path to achieve political change. The third section focuses on controlling territory in disputed areas, including deployment of security forces and building local government capacity. The fourth section examines India’s efforts to isolate the insurgents from their bases of support.