ABSTRACT
Causal realism seems like a piece of common sense. Historically, it is challenged by the writings of the Scottish philosopher David Hume, especially his A Treatise of Human Nature and of his An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. This chapter outlines the ingredients of Hume’s case against causal realism. It presents some possible alternatives to causal realism that might be attributed to Hume. The challenge to causal realism emerges from Hume’s attempt to apply the naturalistic–empiricist approach to causal judgement. The error theory holds that causal judgements do indeed express beliefs, but that they are systematically and uniformly false: the mind’s projection of its feelings on to external objects is an error of presupposition. Subjectivism faces various problems. First, it sits ill with facts about the phenomenology of causal judgement. Second, if Hume holds that subjectivism gives a descriptively adequate account of our concept of necessary connection, why does he expect us to be shocked by his view.
