ABSTRACT
Philosophical discussion of vagueness traces its origins back to at least the pre-Socratics. The Greek logician Eubulides is generally credited with stating the problem of vagueness in its classical form: the paradox of the heap. This chapter explains the basics of the problem and what it means to think that the problem is sometimes a metaphysical one and then outlines some potential motivations for and objections to metaphysical vagueness. The idea that a theory of metaphysical vagueness must be logically revisionary is thus simply mistaken. There are certainly options for theorizing about metaphysical vagueness in a non-classical setting and many of these non-classical frameworks have been popular among defenders of metaphysical vagueness. But the defender of metaphysical vagueness does not need to endorse non-classical logic. There are substantial ways of theorizing about metaphysical vagueness that operate within both a logic, and a metatheory, that is fully classical and requires no logical revision whatsoever.
