ABSTRACT
“Determinism” has been identified with the doctrine that all non-initial events have causes, and with the doctrine that the future is predictable in principle. Like frequentist realists, anti-realists about chance can turn the tension between determinism and realism about single-case chance into an objection. Modern theories of probability evolved from two kinds of critique of the classical theory. The critique that led to the theories that have been primary concern focused on what the classical theory had to say about chance, while a second critique focused on what it had to say about rational judgement and decision making under uncertainty. Realists about chance who are pluralists acknowledge chance and epistemic probability, but insist that their natures are entirely different. In contrast, non-instrumentalist anti-realists about chance hold that the notion of chance is to be explained in terms of personal or inductive probability or both. One promising anti-realist strategy begins with the thought that chance is “objectified” credence.
