ABSTRACT
Were the Melians and Socrates correct, or were the Athenians and Thrasymachus? Do objective moral values such as justice and goodness exist? If they do, then on what basis: naturalism, an eastern monism or pantheism, some version of Platonism where moral values are part of the furniture of reality, theism? Many theistic thinkers have suggested that a connection exists between a personal good God and objective moral values: if such values do exist, then it is likely that a personal, good God exists. This chapter explores some themes related to the moral argument for God’s existence. If objective moral values exist, then God’s existence is probable. This essay addresses the proper basicality of objective moral values, the is-ought problem (the naturalistic fallacy), theism’s greater explanatory power regarding objective moral values, and the unlikelihood of moral values in a God-less universe, and the Euthyphro dilemma. While this essay responds more directly to naturalism, much of its argumentation would apply to other non-theistic perspectives, whether ‘religious’ or not.
