ABSTRACT
Traditional arguments for the rationality of religious belief such as the ontological, cosmological, and teleological arguments seek to demonstrate that God exists or to show that God’s existence is probable on the basis of the evidence of the senses. These may be referred to as cognitive arguments since they aim to show that we can know with certainty or probability that God exists. In contrast, the argument known as ‘Pascal’s Wager’ (Pascal 1973: 92-6) aims to show that it is rational to believe in God, through consideration of the potential value of having this belief. Hence, the Wager may be referred to as a pragmatic argument for belief in God. A summary of Pascal’s Wager is as follows. We are faced with a decision about whether or not to believe in God. Since God is conceived as in nite and the human mind is nite, it is impossible for us to assess whether or not God exists. Using our cognitive capacities alone, we cannot make this decision rationally. But the decision is forced. Therefore, we should base our decision on consideration of what possible effect belief (or disbelief) in God will have on our welfare or happiness. At rst glance, it seems we have everything to gain and nothing to lose if we choose to believe in God. For, if God exists and we believe in him, we shall attain great happiness in the afterlife. If God does not exist, and we believe in him, we haven’t lost much. (Momentarily, Pascal will re ne this last step.) On the other hand, if we choose not to believe in God, we shall not attain great happiness under any circumstance. The diagram or ‘matrix’ from Hacking 1972 represents the features of this decision problem.
