ABSTRACT
The major challenge to theology in the twentieth century came from logical positivism and its principle of veri cation. According to that principle, meaningful hypotheses fall into one of two categories, that of logical and mathematical propositions, or that of propositions which can be found to be true by observation and experimentation. Anything which falls outside these categories, as with many propositions relating to God, is to be dismissed as meaningless, or at least as lacking the character of a factual claim. It is of interest that, on the matter of gods, theists and atheists alike may invoke considerations having to do broadly with veri cation: gods are the sort of being that, if they existed, you would expect to nd, and they are simply not to be found. However, when we turn from gods to God, we turn to a very different concept, and therewith a much more contested role for veri cation. Positivism is generally held to have been discredited, one of the commonest objections being that, since it falls foul of its own requirements for meaningfulness, it can hardly claim to lay down necessary conditions for meaningfulness elsewhere. We may wonder whether this is perhaps too swift a rejection. True, it does not appear that an empirical veri cation can be sought for the principle, but it is less clear that it lacks standing as a conceptual truth. Perhaps, if we had a clearer conception of what meaning and veri cation involve, we should perceive the intimate relation which the positivist alleges. However, just as much to the point is the consideration that certain kinds of proposition, including some we have just been touching upon, invite veri cationist challenges. It is precisely because beings thought real by the ancients are never encountered that we regard claims for their existence as gratuitous. Wittgenstein’s identi cation of meaning with use appears to be a liberating move: a form of words may fail to present a testable hypothesis, but enjoy a use nonetheless. However, it could be that certain kinds of use are possible only if veri ability is assured. For instance, it would seem that A could not be regarded as inductive evidence for B unless B had been found to be so when A obtained; so a condition requiring veri ability is implicit in the characterization of A as evidence of this kind. How do matters stand when we turn from gods to God? Does the veri cationist still have a case to be answered? We may approach this issue via a consideration of the parable of the garden in John Wisdom’s celebrated paper, ‘Gods’ (Wisdom 1944-5: 191-2). After a prolonged absence, two people return to their garden to nd both signs of neglect and apparent evidence of a gardener’s attention. One of them is disposed to play down the disorder, insisting that a gardener has been at work and, as the days pass, explaining the lack of more direct evidence for a gardener by saying that he is invisible to mortal eyes. The other, more impressed by the neglect, refuses to allow that there has been a gardener. Each cites evidence in favor of his case, but eventually the hypothesis of a gardener ceases to be experimental, each party having the same expectations as to what may be found.
