ABSTRACT
In addition to these common traits of the outlooks of religious naturalists, there are also signifi cant differences among them. Some seek to incorporate their outlook into existing religious traditions such as those of Judaism or Christianity; others do not. Some retain concepts of ‘God’ or ‘the divine’; others do not. Some religious naturalists affi rm the whole of nature as the appropriate focus of religious conviction and commitment; others affi rm only a certain aspect of nature in this way. The latter tend to see religious values as melding smoothly into moral values, while the former are more likely to envision a distinctively religious sphere of value. The latter think it essential to affi rm a morally unambiguous religious object, i.e., one that is unqualifi edly good in the moral sense of that term, while the former affi rm the religious value of the whole of nature as their focus of faith despite nature’s admitted amorality or moral ambiguity. Some religious naturalists insist that science alone, especially as exemplifi ed in the natural sciences, is competent to provide objective and reliable descriptions of nature. Meanings and values, including those of religion, are then conceived as human responses to the established theories of the natural sciences at a given time. Others argue that other perspectives, such as those of the humanities, the arts, and the experiences of daily life, should be called upon to complement the natural sciences and to do justice to the fullness of nature in its multiple aspects. Some religious naturalists tend to confi ne the relevant experiences for assessing claims about nature to sensate experiences, thus endorsing in this manner as well as others a narrower meaning of ‘scientifi c.’ Others expand the range of relevant experiences to include such things as aesthetic, moral, and religious experiences, as well as the full range of experienced conditions, needs, functions, and aspirations of human life. The latter insist on testing claims about nature and the place of humans in nature on the basis of lived experience in all of its dimensions, not just sensate experiences. This kind of religious naturalist obviously has a broader conception of what it means to reason scientifi cally and to be a scientifi c empiricist. With these characterizations and contrasts in mind, we can now discuss views of some of those who have developed versions of religious naturalism in the twentieth and twenty-fi rst centuries, the period in which this outlook has come to the fore as a signifi cant movement in religious thought in the West. The discussion can serve as a representative sampling of this viewpoint’s various forms.
