ABSTRACT
The primitive language-game introduced in §2 of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations has been the object of much controversy.2 Primitive languagegames are characterized by Wittgenstein as objects of comparison (Vergleichsobiekte) employed in the process of giving a perspicuous description of the way in which our language actually works. Wittgenstein writes:
Our clear and simple language-games are not preparatory studies for a future regimentation of language-as it were first approximations, ignoring friction and air resistance. The language-games are rather set up as objects of comparison which are meant to throw light on the facts of our language by way not only of similarities, but also of dissimilarities. (PI §130)
A statement in a similar spirit occurs in Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology:
When one describes simple language-games in illustration, let’s say, of what we call the “motive” of an action, then more involved cases keep on being held up before one, in order to show that our theory doesn’t yet correspond to the facts. Whereas more involved cases are just more involved cases. For if what were in question were a theory, it might indeed be said: It’s no use looking at these special cases, they offer no explanation of the most important cases. On the contrary, the simple language-games play a quite different role. They are the poles of a description, not the ground-floor of a theory.
