ABSTRACT
Social scientists have for long been concerned to understand the social basis of marriage. This ranges from anthropological interest in kinship patterns (Goode 1964), through sociological analysis of social mobility (Goldthorpe et al. 1987), to economic accounts of the ‘marriage market’ (Becker 1991). A theme that often recurs in this discussion is the role of homogamy-the idea that ‘like marries like’. Why should this be of continuing interest? A compelling reason is that the extent of homogamy tells us something about how open a society might be. If couples become less closely united on the basis of social distinctions such as wealth or education, then social divisions between couples, and between households, become less pronounced. This process would be a complement of other (if sometimes contradictory) evidence of a growth in social mobility. Thus, increasing heterogamy is associated for some analysts with a breaking down of social divisions, and implicitly with the strengthening of an open and democratic society (Hakim 2000; Ultee and Luijkx 1990). Conversely, if homogamy is rising, this suggests some form of social closure, which might also stretch across the generations. Parents who have equally high levels of education, income or wealth can transmit additional benefi ts to their children through the resultant pooling of resources, whether material, cultural or intellectual (Blossfeld and Timm 2003). This, in Bourdieu’s view, would be a compensatory strategy of reproduction that the relatively privileged might use to counteract the equalising effects of increased social mobility (Bourdieu 1976)—the welloff ‘close ranks’. Mare speaks of ‘barriers to marriage between persons with unequal amounts of formal schooling’ (1991: 30; our emphasis). In this case, homogamy and social mobility have opposite effects.
