ABSTRACT
This chapter seeks to show how and why the ‘failed states’ agenda became securitized after 9/11 paying particular attention to the legitimating function the ‘humanitarian intervention-cum-failed state’ has for pre-emptive and even preventive use of force as it relates to regime change. It demonstrates that legitimation, particularly from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), has become a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for using force among Western states. The chapter will substantiate the thesis that norms relating to the use of force have been reinterpreted in an ever-widening manner as evidenced in the birth, and quick death, of humanitarian intervention practices. It is further argued that actual intervention practice has not led to any new rules for using force, intervening in the affairs of other states, nor engaging in preventive warfare. Rather the situation appears very unclear, as the rules for using force both in a reactive and pre-emptive fashion are severely contested. Yet this is where the state interest in using force is predominant at present. In the absence of UNSC and United Nations Charter (UNC) normative legitimacy all this chapter can conclude is that the legitimation – the necessary, but not sufficient condition – for such use of force may draw on norms found within the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).
