ABSTRACT
Business and politics are closely connected. Many members of the business elite are members of influential interest groups. In democratic polyarchies, western students of political science have noted the disproportionate influence of large economic corporations in the political process.1 The role of economic corporations with their resources and political interests is one of the reasons for a deformation of polyarchies, in which the dispersion of power is far from even. Russia is clearly not a western-type polyarchy. The concentration of power
in the hands of certain influence groups is much higher than in the West, and politically active business structures usually compete with high-ranking state officials for influence or enter into clientelistic relations with them. The Russian situation should be analysed from the standpoint of elitism, rather than competitive polyarchy because of this massive concentration of power in the hands of power and business elites. Members of these economic and political elites are closely intertwined and at the same time split into rivalling groups. Unequal access to power has been characteristic of Russia at every stage
of its history. The post-Soviet period is no exception, epitomized as it is by a sharp increase in socio-economic inequalities and new and deeper forms of social inequality brought about in the transition from communism to capitalism. When public interest in politics is low, personal involvement is insignificant and party politics and interest group activity is badly organized, politics becomes a playground for small groups well endowed with financial resources and roots in the business environment, or those enjoying patrimonial-clientelistic relations with the business environment. The universal rationality model, or ‘rational choice theory’, seems to be
the most obvious analytic paradigm to employ when studying the political activity of business structures and individual entrepreneurs. This stems from another principle widely regarded as self-evident, namely that an entrepreneur is by definition a rational actor in the economic realm and that such rational behaviour will be transferred to the political realm. In our case gain means not only a growth of political influence, but also an expansion of the firms of those entrepreneurs who engage in politics. The political market, as
referred to by Schumpeter,2 can be viewed as analogous to the economic market, even as its extension, if groups with specific economic interests enter the political market. The application of rational choice theory to the study of business elites
entering politics has serious limitations. First of all, business interests connected with certain branches of the economy, types of ownership and enterprise, etc., must be considered in view of the authority of specific political institutions. Seeking a measure of control over political administrations may be considered optimal and rational behaviour on the part of businesses. Such control can be exercised indirectly through lobbying or through the direct infiltration of business representatives in legislative or executive bodies of state power. Whilst studying the above-mentioned links, it is important to consider the
specific economic model and political regime. The Russian model is often referred to as a form of state-bureaucratic capitalism, in which the bureaucracy performs a number of regulatory functions and possesses massive capabilities for influencing or pressurizing businesses. At the same time the existence of a widespread shadow economy, and a tolerant attitude towards it on the part of the bureaucracy, creates infinite possibilities for manipulating legislation in order to put pressure on some businesses whilst stimulating the growth of others. The following areas can be identified in which the interests of both businesses and political structures intersect:
• Regulating functions of state and municipal administrations, in particular licensing various economic activities, including the exploitation of mineral resources.
