During the period of the George W. Bush presidencies, there has been continuous debate about the development of European-American relations and about the future of the Atlantic alliance. Much of this debate has been centred on the different perceptions of and dispositions towards security that can be discerned on the two sides of the Atlantic; thus we have seen the apparent opposition of ‘Mars and Venus’ and the often vicious transatlantic exchanges linked to successive crises, especially that over the decision to invade Iraq in 2003. On the other hand, and despite differences over specific policy issues, there has been apparent continuity and commonality of interests in a series of major policy areas spanning not just security, but trade, investment, and the future of the global economy. How are we to square the circle of seeming opposition and apparent

commonality of interests, in a way that enables us to analyse and evaluate not only the Bush years but the prospects for future transatlantic cooperation, especially but not only in security issues? This volume arises out of this question, and it proposes an approach based on perception and misperception as one way of extending our understanding of the Atlantic partnership. The conference at which the papers comprising this volume were originally presented took place in 2006; this marked the 30th anniversary of the publication of Robert Jervis’ classic work on perception and misperception,1

which gave additional point to the attempt to understand the transatlantic relationship in the terms he proposes. The volume, therefore, brings together two strands: first, the analysis of

perceptions and misperceptions in the world arena, and second, the desire to understand and evaluate the current transatlantic relationship and its possible future development. In this way, we propose, we can understand not only the operation of formal alliance, expressed especially through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), but also the less formal ways in which transatlantic partners learn about each other, frame expectations of behaviour, and shape their policy actions. This approach promises a number of analytical payoffs. First, it introduces into the study of alliance or partnership an approach that has historically been more often used to understand those involved in adversarial relationships. This dimension is clearly of

potential significance to the views we form of crises within the ‘western alliance’, and of the ways in which those crises are managed by the participants. The approach based on perceptions and misperceptions does not eliminate the need for analysis of institutions and the evaluation of broader international structures, but it does promise to give us an additional insight into the kinds of processes that attend alliance politics, and which can in principle be evaluated by reference to what the alliance members thought they were doing in specific situations. Second, the approach takes us away from an analysis based solely on

material interest and power, although of course it does not replace such an approach. It enables us to build into our appreciation of power and interests a sense of history through which we can assess the impact both of specific conjunctures and of the parallels or analogies mobilized by policy-makers – in other words, the impact of ‘lessons of the past’ and their application to the present and the future. This in turn links to the analysis of learning and adaptation by participants in the changing transatlantic relationship, and to the ways in which they shape their expectations of appropriate behaviour within it. As noted above, there has been extensive use of a perceptions/ misperceptions framework in dealing with these issues as they make themselves felt in adversarial relationships, but it is our contention that alliance relationships and those of partnership, as expressed in transatlantic relations, can be usefully studied through this framework. Both of the payoffs outlined above can be linked to a third: one that might

broadly be described as the changing meaning of transatlantic relations. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, those relations have been put under enormous pressure, but we must remember that ‘terminal’ crises for the transatlantic relationship have been identified almost on a one-perdecade basis since the 1950s. What a perceptions/misperceptions approach promises is that we can place these crises and their outcomes into a framework dealing with the development of diverse – and often competing – meanings held by the participants. Not only this, but we can address an arguably more fundamental issue: the nature of security itself as perceived by the members of the ‘transatlantic community’. To understand this aspect of the relationship, we need to be aware of developments not only at the transatlantic level, but also within the broader global arena and within the domestic contexts of decision-making on both sides of the Atlantic. When we build these developments at various levels into our analysis of perceptions and misperceptions, such an analysis is enriched with a heightened awareness of the constraints and opportunities perceived by policy-makers, and thus we are enabled to gain an understanding of the ways in which alliance tensions can be dealt with or exploited. The volume thus engages in a distinctive way with some of the key ques-

tions that have been raised by the turbulent years of the George W. Bush presidencies. Why have American policy-makers taken unilateral and apparently dismissive positions on the development of transatlantic relations? Why

have European policy-makers been apparently incapable of developing consistent and collectively agreed policies towards the United States? Can the Bush years be taken apart from the broader development of the transatlantic relationship over the past 60 years? Are there really fundamentally different perceptions of power and security on the two sides of the Atlantic? How much might or might not change when the Bush years are gone and we are faced with a new President? How do US and European policy-makers respond – and how might they respond in the future – to key challenges such as those posed by a newly assertive Russia, or the persistent threat of global terrorism? The chapters that follow address all of these issues in a variety of ways. In

line with the aims of the volume, we begin with the views of Robert Jervis himself on the ways in which theories of perception and misperception might help us to understand recent US foreign policy and transatlantic relations. This is followed by the ‘European’ view of Rubén Herrero de Castro, which focuses not only on the application of theories of perception and misperception, but also on the ways in which they can be applied to the policy clashes that have characterized recent transatlantic relations. In Chapter 4, Robert J. Lieber advances a robust argument about the ways in which transatlantic relations express enduring commonalities of interest and perception, but also notes a number of the enduring imbalances that characterize the ‘western alliance’. Michael Smith, in Chapter 5, sets out to explore the ways in which theories of perception and misperception can be used to understand the historical evolution of transatlantic relations in the light of broader international relations approaches, and suggests that these ways can be extended to explore notions of alliance learning and institutionalization. In Chapter 6, Natividad Fernández Sola explores the specific issue of the European collective presence within transatlantic relations, and asks whether current and recent tensions have led to the empowerment of the European Union as a major participant in the relationship. In Chapter 7, David García Cantalapiedra presents a detailed study of the

ways in which ideas of perception and misperception can be related to problems of security and to the kinds of ‘alliance security dilemmas’ that emerge from the pursuit of alliance in a rapidly changing global arena. Carla Monteleone, in Chapter 8, takes the analysis further by focusing on the broader social foundations of transatlantic relations and relating these to processes of change in international structure and domestic interests – a key dimension in the social context of policy-maker perceptions. The two final chapters in the volume, by Carlos Echevarria Jesús (Chapter 9) and Alex Marshall (Chapter 10), focus on two key current policy issues: the ‘war on terror’ and responses to change in Russia. They note important disparities of perception between European and US policy-makers, and argue for the need for the reappraisal of policies and institutions in the light of changing contexts. The result of these several and different ‘cuts’ at the problem of percep-

tions and policy in transatlantic relations is perhaps a sharper set of

questions for further research and analysis, rather than a definitive set of answers to the key questions set out earlier in this Introduction. It does appear that transatlantic relations can be explored through the lens of perception and misperception, and that this gives a new perspective on the evolution and functioning of the ‘western alliance’. This general conclusion gives rise to a number of more specific conclusions: that history does matter in transatlantic relations; that policy-makers can not escape easily from the structural and material constraints within which they work; that divergent perceptions in key policy areas can coexist with strong underlying perceptions of common interest; that self-perception on the part of the Europeans and the Americans is a key element to a richer understanding of the ways in which transatlantic relations work; that the nature of power, security, society, and global change are important in shaping perceptions within the transatlantic relationship; and that dealing with specific challenges to transatlantic solidarity will remain a key dimension of the relationship for the foreseeable future. It is our contention that long-established theories of perception and misperception can thus be applied with fresh impact and insight to this most enduring yet turbulent partnership.