ABSTRACT
In international human rights law legal prescriptions establishing individual justiciable rights are typically formulated in generally phrased principles. Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention)1
stipulates that: ‘The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground . . .’ and provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of possible discrimination grounds. Matters such as the circumstances constituting discrimination, the possibilities for justifying a difference in treatment and the allocation of the burden of proof, to name a few, are not addressed. Content and meaning of the legal norm are therefore derived almost entirely from its interpretation and application in individual cases. A further important characteristic of international human rights law is the highly complicated political and legal process necessary to amend the legal instruments. The Convention cannot be amended easily to reflect developments in society or new theoretical insights. For example, discussions on a specific protocol on non-discrimination began in the 1960s, but only in 2000 was Protocol 122 finally adopted. Subsequently, a further five years elapsed before the Protocol had been ratified by the required 10 states for it to take effect, and as of early September 2007 only 15 of the 47 Member States had ratified.
