ABSTRACT
Displays of political will to tackle excessive peasant burdens have been a recurrent feature in China’s past. In the view of some authors, fiscal extraction has even been the driving force of Chinese history. A new dynasty, this view holds, begins with good relations between those governing and those governed. Gradually, however, the administrative apparatus grows. More and more funds are needed to sustain it, stifling productivity and hindering economic growth. In order to satisfy its ever-increasing needs, the bloated bureaucracy then applies predatory measures to extract funds from the (predominantly rural) populace, eventually leading to the large-scale popular uprisings that characterize dynastic decline (Zhang 2001: 36-37). The successor dynasty drastically simplifies the fiscal system and starts the same process all over again. The central leadership is well aware of this circle; hence the rising number of rural protests, petitions and large-scale riots taking place since the 1990s are regarded very seriously. In order to prevent rural instability and a regime breakdown, efforts have been made to reduce the peasant burden, improve local governance and close the ever-increasing gaps in wealth by developing the countryside.1 The Rural Tax and Fee Reform (RTFR) has been the latest and most far-reaching of these efforts, and the name belies the scope of institutional change it has come to entail. Besides reducing peasant burden through the implementation of a standardized tax system, substantial local level institutional change comprises the major policy aim. So far, the RTFR has proceeded in three stages.
