ABSTRACT
Self-disclosure has been rapidly shedding its reputation as the technique of last resort for the inexperienced or insufficiently trained therapist. Although analytic clinicians have historically been less inclined to self-disclose (Simon, 1988; Myers & Hayes, 2006), there were several analysts in the 1930s to 1950s who strongly advocated for self-disclosure, especially to confirm the client’s reality and when the analyst had contributed to an empathic break or impasse (Little, 1951; Ferenczi, 1932/1988; Tauber, 1954). As Rachman (1993) said in discussing the work of Ferenczi, “by the analyst’s self-disclosing his own contribution to the emotional experience, he becomes the parent who is willing to take responsibility for contributing to any, even unintentional, emotional difficulty” (p. 93). These pioneering attempts to endorse self-disclosure when it was needed to acknowledge the reality of the emotional scenario taking place between analyst and client were buried by the mainstream analysts in favor of ongoing “neutrality.”
