ABSTRACT
Tradition has it that theories are carriers of knowledge telling us what the empirical world is like. Scientific models are thought to be of little consequence in this context. In the early days of twentieth century philosophy of science, it was common to consider models merely as hypothetical and as heuristic devices (famously, Duhem [1914] 1954; also Carnap 1939: 69). When models became a “hotter” topic in the 1960s, their role was delineated as explanatory (Harré 1960; Achinstein 1968) and, less frequently, as creative (Hesse 1966). Those who preferred formal approaches adopted the mathematical model-theory as a guideline, resulting in the so-called “semantic view” of theories (Suppes 1961 and others). These traditions of interpreting models have repercussions and followers to this day (Bailer-Jones 1999).
