ABSTRACT
When Israel was established on 15 May 1948, its founding fathers took the
position that the nation’s long-term international interests would be better served by relations with the newly formed People’s Republic of China (PRC)
and informally known as both ‘‘China’’ and ‘‘Communist China,’’ than with
that nation’s offshore rival, the Republic of China on Taiwan, known
informally as ‘‘Formosa,’’ the ‘‘ROC,’’ and ‘‘Nationalist China.’’ On 9 Jan-
uary 1950, the State of Israel became the first Middle Eastern nation to
recognize the People’s Republic of China, long before any other Middle
Eastern country, and at time when, outside of the Communist bloc, China
only had relations with Denmark, India, and Sweden. Sporadic contacts continued between the two nations until December 1954, when China made
a conscious effort to distance itself from Israel. The specific incident that
marks the beginning of a ‘‘frozen’’ period between the two nations was the
Bogor, Indonesia organizational meeting for the Afro Asian summit con-
ference in Bandung, Indonesia. China was scheduled to participate in Ban-
dung. The Bogor organizers resolved, despite stiff protests from Ceylon, to
exclude Israel from the summit, establishing a precedent for Israeli exclu-
sion from ‘‘Third World’’ and ‘‘Non-aligned’’ gatherings thereafter. Within a month, Israel began to feel the brunt of the Bogor decision and observed
that China went along with it. On 28 January 1955, a delegation headed by
Israeli Ambassador to Burma David Hacohen, arrived in Beijing for a long-
scheduled, four-week visit. The commission was only met by a Chinese vice
foreign minister and lesser officials. It was not received by Chinese Premier
and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai, who had met Hacohen previously in
Burma and who had authorized the visit. The signals of diplomatic frigidity
were unmistakable.1
