ABSTRACT
The monopoly of violence in a determined territory is an essential characterisitic of statehood (Weber 1978). The acceptance or recognition of a given authority structure is one aspect of domestic sovereignty yet the level of control that officials can actually exercise is crucial for that sovereignty to be effective (Krasner 2001). Yet, since the end of the Cold War and with it, the end of superpower support to their allies, there has been a marked increase in the number of states whose monopoly of force has been challenged. A plethora of terms has been put forward to describe phenomenon: fragile states (USAID), wobbly states (David Sogge), crisis states (LSE), states at risk of instability (UK Cabinet Office study), warlord states (Will Reno) (Woodward 2005). These terms refer to a combination of factors but they all point to the ineffectiveness of a government to control its territory, the lack of perceived legitimacy by a significant portion of its population, the high level of domestic insecurity and/or the failure to provide basic public services to its citizens (Failed States Index 2006). In these conditions, the legimitate monopoly of force might be seen in the hands of outside actors. Indeed, if one of the essential roles of government is to deter violence – to possess a monopoly of the legitimate use of force and to wield it so that individuals and groups refrain from engaging in serious conflict – when the state is too weak, the question then becomes: how can outsiders step in to play this essential role?
