Delegation and the nature of Security Council authority

This chapter examines the UN Security Council’s authority from the perspective of principal-agent theory. Principal-agent theories stipulate that a set of principals (states) delegate a specific task to an agent (the IO) in the expectation that the IO has or will create an advantage in executing the task (Hawkins et al. 2006; Martin 2003; Nielson and Tierney 2003; Pollack 1997. For a critique, see Barnett and Finnemore 1999). Such advantages may include neutrality, expertise, efficiency, or some other asset that states find difficult to achieve in the absence of an IO. It is generally in the interest of states to grant the IO some amount of discretion in how it executes its task. This leaves the principals with a difficult trade-off: on the one hand, they may wish to ensure that the agent (IO) implements decisions that fit the states’ objectives; on the other hand, curtailing the agent’s independence may negate the potential advantages of delegation.