The topic of my contribution was suggested to me, and I also accepted it as

suggested. But on a first reflection, the following question had already

posed itself: had the concept for the intended phenomenon been correctly

chosen? Why ‘religious faith’ (Gla¨ubigkeit) and not ‘faith’ (Glaube)? Is the

concept of ‘religious faith’ supposed to state that National Socialism

involved merely a questionable faith attitude? Does ‘religious faith’ mark a

rank lesser than ‘faith’ in describing the stance the human being assumes

before its divinity in traditional religions? If this were case, then a valuation would have made before the phenomenon had even been described and

analysed. In order to avoid this error and to keep the concepts value-free,

one path seemed to me to be feasible. It was suggested by the following

reflection: in pietism, the concept, ‘religious faith’ is often used to designate

one’s own subjective belief-attitude in contrast to the ‘faith’ of the institu-

tionalised church. Certainly, a value judgement is implicit in the way the

concepts are used here as well – albeit the opposite of the one that was

suspected at the beginning. The pietistic distinction between ‘religious faith’ and ‘faith’ has provided me with a model for an analogous application of

concepts – albeit one that is to be strictly descriptive and classificatory.

Accordingly, the subjective faith-stance of the individual National Socialist

shall be called ‘religious faith’, and that which the National Socialist regime

demanded and launched using various measures to as many members of the

society as possible shall be called ‘faith’. The topic of my presentation,

therefore, would actually have to be ‘Religious faith and faith in National

Socialism’. In the case of National Socialism, ‘religious faith’ undoubtedly coop-

erated with ‘faith’. It was not, therefore, a heterodox phenomenon as it is

with pietism; rather, the two phenomenal forms demand different strategies

of analysis. Insofar as subjective ‘religious faith’ entails the gaining of

insights into the interior life of the believer, the discovery of his motives,

needs and wishes, the perspective of religious-psychology is recommended.

With the officially propagated ‘faith’, by contrast, we must inquire as to the

means by which it was demanded and the goals it was intended to serve; here, the function-oriented perspective of political science would be suitable.

Because the latter object lies more open to our view than the first, I shall

turn to it first.