ABSTRACT
Human organisms are physical (biochemical, neurobiological) systems that are subject to physical causality; at the same time, human beings like to see themselves as reflexive, intentional subjects whose actions can be explained and predicted with reference to mental states, and as responsible agents to whom notions of rationality and morality apply. The boundary work and disciplinary identity of psychology have been, and continue to be, shaped by this basic ontological tension, as well as by the methodological and theoretical orientations that are related to these different points of view. I need to mention here only the traditional debates revolving around presumed dichotomies such as explanation versus understanding, freedom versus determinism, causes versus reasons, and the like. Although psychologists today tend to take a relaxed, if not neglectful, attitude toward these traditional controversies, it can hardly be denied that-despite many attempts to deconstruct the dualisms-the basic ontological tensions are far from being re-
solved. It rather seems that we are dealing with a kind of ambiguous ontological figure or Kippfigur (comparable to the well-known duck vs. rabbit drawing) where none of the conflicting perspectives can claim to be the true or correct one, and where any such claims appear “essentially contestable” (Gallie, 1955).
