ABSTRACT
The majority of the chapters in this volume consider large-scale behavioral phenomena (e.g., emotional states) at long time intervals (e.g., weeks and months). In this chapter, we take something of a departure. Two differences are of particular importance. The first is with respect to the time scale of interest, and the second is with respect to what we might think of as the epistemological goals of a dynamic modeling effort. With respect to time, whereas the majority of the chapters in this volume are concerned with time at the level of hours, days, months, and so forth, we concern ourselves with milliseconds. With respect to epistemic goals, whereas the majority of the chapters in this volume have been focused on (for example) the use of dynamic conceptions to reveal underlying structures in data, we use methods of dynamic systems modeling to construct formal representations of hypotheses regarding rather specific mechanisms for the production of observable data. Although it turns out that the first of these differences holds little import (assuming, as we do, that measures of time exist on a ratio scale; see Townsend, 1992), the second of these differences deserves some discussion.
