ABSTRACT
The period between the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and the present has been one of reaction. The priority for the United States, Europe and other key “fields of jihad” has been, quite understandably, self-protection and, therefore, “hard” security and counter-terrorism. Thus, as the five-year anniversary of the 9/11 attacks draws near, the War on Terror continues to be prosecuted with some vigor and tactical coordination (for example, through counter-terrorism intelligence centers established between the US and other governments) but with a deficit of strategic direction. Hard power – military counter-insurgency in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere; law enforcement and intelligence cooperation; homeland security – still constitute the bulk of the overall effort. Yet, since the US-led takedown of al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan in late 2001 and early 2002, the indisputable overall tendency of the global Islamist terrorist network has been to disperse and atomize, such that groups in Europe and potentially the US inspired by 9/11 and other spectacular jihadist operations will spring up more or less autonomously and spontaneously in largely urban areas, manned more by “local talent” than by imports from Afghanistan, the Gulf, South or Southeast Asia, or other fields of jihad. The attacks in Madrid and London are consistent with this observed pattern. The current overall approach to counter-terrorism appears inadequate for redressing this development. There is, in particular, an acute need to tailor global and local policies so that they harmonize with one another – or at least do not work at cross-purposes.
