ABSTRACT
In the aftermath of a peace agreement, the signatories sometimes stick to peace, but in other instances, renewed cycles of violence follow in the wake of a deal. Why are some peace agreements successful in ending civil wars, while others fail? The role of spoilers has been highlighted in previous research (e.g. Stedman 1997, 2003). According to Downs and Stedman (2002: 56), ‘The presence of spoilers in peace agreements poses daunting challenges to implementation.’ More generally, several studies suggest that rebel groups on the outside of a peace agreement pose a threat to peace settlements (Ayres 2006; Kydd and Walter 2002; Newman and Richmond 2006, forthcoming; Stedman 1997; Zahar 2003, 2006).2 However, this issue has largely been left unexplored in the quantitative research on durable peace. Therefore, little is known about the general patterns by which rebel groups on the outside of a deal may influence whether the signatories stick to peace or engage in violence.3
