ABSTRACT
The 1967 Harmel Report was, on the one hand, a reaction to the crisis in the alliance caused by France’s withdrawal from the integrated structures of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and on the other hand, it represented an attempt to adapt the alliance to the conditions of the emerging East-West détente. In 1966, a number of politicians had argued for bridging the divide between the East and the West, albeit with very different objectives in mind. In a much-noted speech in New York, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson had called for new approaches to overcome the division of Europe.1 French President Charles de Gaulle had also advocated intensified détente and cooperation between the East and the West while on a visit to Moscow.2 Around the same time, the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) had been developing the idea of a European peace order that was presented in several speeches and articles by Foreign Minister Willy Brandt after he assumed office in December 1966.3
Several members of NATO had been urging that the alliance look into possibilities for closer East-West cooperation. They were no longer willing to support the position of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) on the German question. In response to Bonn’s concerns that the division might slip from the spotlight, they replied that a solution was much more apt to be found in a climate of détente than in the prevailing entrenched situation. Their primary motive was, however, the revitalization of political and cultural relations that had been frozen during the Cold War. They also hoped to open up new opportunities for investment and markets for their goods in Eastern Europe.
