ABSTRACT
Before the French Revolution, most wars in Europe, according to Clausewitz (1832/1984), were fought by professional armies of limited size and interests. Rulers were generally unable to involve their subjects directly, and therefore once their forces had been defeated, it was difficult to mobilize a new army. Thus, the devastating effects of war tended to be minimized. However, beginning with Napoleon, war “became the business of the people” (Clausewitz 1832/1984, p. 592), and the people’s passions and energy were stoked and mobilized through rhetoric and propaganda (Holtman 1950). The course of war was no longer determined by a rational calculus of interests of elite rulers but by the prejudices and emotions of everyday people, as evidenced in the US Civil War, two world wars, the Cold War, and numerous ethnic conflicts and acts of terrorism. It has become an accepted principle that to win a modern war – or any other conflict, for that matter, since “war is merely the continuation of politics by other means” – one must win what has been called “hearts and minds” (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1999).
