ABSTRACT
There are many subjects currently debated in the ongoing discussion about Japan’s approaches to structural reform. Nevertheless, the notorious ‘construction state’ still remains a basic puzzle of the Japanese political economy. According to Broadbent (2002: 43), a construction state (doken kokka) can be defined as a government which puts much more public investment into the construction of public works than can be realistically justified by public need. The Japanese construction state is a phenomenon rooted in the prewar years. However, it became outstanding from other industrialized countries especially in the past two decades, as the level of public construction investment has grown excessively (DeWit and Steinmo 2002: 172). At its heart, a system of collusion between politicians, bureaucrats, and businessmen can be identified that evolved under Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) long-term one-party rule in postwar Japan. These actors are linked by an extensive network of formal and informal ties and are bound in a so-called ‘iron triangle’ of benefit and influence (Woodall 1996; McCormack 2002; Feldhoff 2005).
