Carl Schmitt’s hostility towards universalism in politics is well known. According to him, universalism excludes politics because politics presupposes pluralism, that is, plurality of incommensurable perspectives: ‘The political world is a pluriverse, not a universe’ (Schmitt 1996a: 53). However, universalism is capable of excluding politics only in principle. Whenever universalistic concepts – such as humanity – are brought into practice their nature necessarily changes, the reason being that human practice and action always take place in a determinate time and place. Thereby, universalistic concepts too, which first were mere abstractions located in a void, become rooted in a determinate time and place, meaning that, they lose their universalistic character. According to Schmitt, they become weapons in the hands of particular peoples and social groups. In the sphere of political action, universalism becomes deception – even murderous deception. Universalism becomes a means of ‘a most awful expansion and a murderous imperialism’ (Schmitt 1999: 205).