ABSTRACT
The distinction between positive and normative, between what is and what ought to be, has been of great importance in economics. The epistemological justifications of induction, empiricism, positivism, and science qua science have been erected in part on the belief that the distinction is meaningful in both theory and practice. Yet the probative value of the distinction has been in serious doubt. The conceptual distinction between what is and what ought to be has not been in question. What has been controversial is whether analysis, even straightforward statements, can in practice be value-and ideology-free. Even many who accept the conceptual distinction find that because of the practical exercise of normative choice in the selection of topics for research, the formulation of problems for analysis, the role of preconceptions, the use of theory-laden data infused with valuational or ideological assumptions, the exercise of selective subjective perception, and so on, it is difficult, if not impossible, to conduct purely nonnormative inquiry and to make value-and ideology-free statements. The most convincing solution to this problem seems no longer to be the further development and use of presumably objective techniques, but the explicit identification of all value premises. Thus, John C. Harsanyi, in his New Palgrave entry on “Value Judgements,” concludes by affirming that:
Of course, value judgements often play an important role in economics even when they are not the main subjects of investigation. They influence the policy recommendations made by economists and their judgements about the merits of alternative systems of economic organization. But this need not impair the social utility of the work done by economists as long as it is work of high intellectual quality and as long as the economists concerned know what they are doing, know the qualifications their conclusions are subject to, and tell their readers what these qualifications are. In particular, intellectual honesty requires economists to state their political and moral value
judgements and to make clear how their conclusions differ from those that economists of different points of view would tend to reach on the problems under discussion.
