ABSTRACT
Democratic control of armed forces in Georgia is still far from perfect, in spite of the laws that have been adopted in recent years. Indeed, after the 1991 break away from the Soviet Union (by referendum), Georgia adopted various laws which aimed at establishing democratic accountability of the military and other security forces. However, the two selected case studies show that these new laws did not entirely reflect the reality of Georgian political-military relations. The first case study refers to a long-term process by which the Georgian parliament has tried to install proper control over defence budgets. Notwithstanding American foreign aid aimed at facilitating implementation of a sophisticated defence planning, programming and budgeting system (PPBS), the parliament was unable to exert meaningful control over the way taxpayers’ money was spent on defence. The second case study analyses the lack of parliamentary involvement in overseeing various covert operations (e.g. in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict zone). These covert operations led to a profound dissatisfaction in parliament and society at large, forcing President Shevardnadze to sack the entire government in 2001.
