ABSTRACT
This quotation from Margaret Thatcher’s speech to the Tory Party Conference shortly after her 1979 election victory suggests that some politicians believe that in time governments can shift the electorate in their direction. As natural as this view might seem to a leader like Thatcher, it is capable of creating shock-waves among rational choice theorists seeking to model party competition in the ‘Downsian’ tradition. Following neo-classical economics’ assumption that consumer preferences are exogenous to competition between firms, voter preferences are typically treated as exogenous to political competition. As usual, Downs’ view is more complex and nuanced: ‘though parties will move ideologically to adjust to the [voter] distribution under some circumstances, they will also attempt to move voters towards their own location, thus altering it’ (1957: 140). Although some have also recognised this possibility (Dunleavy and Ward, 1981; Przeworski and Sprague, 1986: 125-126; Gerber and Jackson, 1993; Grofman and Withers, 1995: 56; Jackson, 2003), it has largely been lost sight of in the formal literature, and many remain sceptical about the empirical case for preference shaping.
