ABSTRACT
Behavioral economics originated largely as a critique of neoclassical thinking about rationality and individual preferences. Largely overlooked by the proponents of this critique is the fact that preferences constitute the basis on which the personal identity of the individual may be understood in neoclassical theory, and thus that the behavioral critique has implications for how we might think about personal identity in economics. Moreover, since the implicit account of personal identity in neoclassical theory in terms of preferences is circular and empty (Davis 2003), and since some account of personal identity is ultimately necessary to be able to talk about individuals in economics, also overlooked is the question: Does behavioral economics, in addition to what it offers for thinking about rationality and choice, offer a secure foundation for thinking about personal identity to fill the gap left by neoclassical theory? Alternatively, might it rather be the case that behavioral economics makes no improvement on the neoclassical account of individual identity, and thus follows neoclassical theory in begging the question of what makes individuals individual in economics? In light of these questions, it is interesting not only that cognitive psychology, from which behavioral economics is drawn, possesses a widely shared view of what constitutes personal identity, but that this view involves a reinterpretation of the very same philosophical foundations that underlie the unsuccessful neoclassical view of identity, namely John Locke’s understanding of identity in terms of memory. Can Locke’s memory view of identity, then, be taken up and reinterpreted in behavioral economics in such a way as to escape the problems that arise in connection with neoclassical theory?
