ABSTRACT
Memory, it is frequently claimed, has nothing to do with experience. It is also held that foundationalism in epistemology must rest on what is self-evident. Each claim is a myth, as Meinong shows in his unacknowledged classic discussion of mnesic phenomena, Zur erkenntnistheoretischen Würdigung des Gedächtnisses.1 Meinong’s text revolves around three fundamental theses. The first is a restricted conception of memory, very different from the liberal position advocated by most contemporary psychologists and philosophers. I expound this thesis, defend it in a new way and argue for a slightly superior, Meinongian position on the nature of memory and its links with judgements and experiences. The second consists in a subtle assessment of epistemic circularity which demolishes the attempts of many later philosophers and provides an original argument for the third: some basic beliefs have defeasible justification. I defend these two theses against various objections. Contrasting Meinong’s claims with more recent positions reveals their crucial importance for the philosophy of memory.
