ABSTRACT
What is the reason for the oft-noted difference between human progress in science and the abysmal lack thereof in solving social and political problems? Perhaps a fundamental distinction between scientific and ethical knowledge bears responsibility. Science involves matters of empirical fact to which all must accede while ethics deals with values over which there is not only general disagreement, but also no means for achieving consensus. Therefore, thinkers have long sought ways to derive an ethical system from factual matters of science, to deduce what one ought to do from what is the case, to distill evaluations from descriptions. In this tradition of naturalist ethics, Skinner (1953, Ch. 28; 1971, Ch. 6) contributes a version based on his behaviorist vision of society. His proposed science of ethics, supported by his science of behavior, promises to resolve ethical questions by the objective, empirical, and naturalistic methods of science. My purposes are threefold. First, I shall explicate what I take to be Skinner’s Naturalist Deduction, that is, his methods for deriving ethical judgments from statements of scientific fact. Second, I shall examine what this Naturalist Deduction does and does not accomplish. Third, I shall elaborate on his behaviorist ethics.
