ABSTRACT
The social sciences have benefited greatly from the elaboration of a concept of ‘practice’ that contrasts sharply with the model of rationally calculated action. ‘Practice’ brings into view activities which are situated, corporeal, and shaped by habits without reflection. This notion has been extraordinarily successful and has now been extended to cover every sort of human activity. Not surprisingly, this success has generated debate and revealed problems in this extended usage which covers an enormous diversity of behaviors designated by that term. From one branch of the social sciences to another, the specific character of what counts as a practice differs significantly. Yet, applied with decreasing rigor, the category serves today as a sort of cement for the social sciences. It may be said that the felicity of the concept comes from its extraordinary breadth. It points equally well to agency of the most personal or intimate kind and to agency that is collective, public, or institutional. But the obvious cost of this extension is that it hinders the detailed clarification of differences between types of agency. This is important because these differences are a major feature of our contemporary societies.
