ABSTRACT
France, victorious but weakened by its human losses and the burden of its devastated regions, found itself in 1919 confronted by a Germany that did not accept its defeat and whose territory, if reduced, had not been similarly ravaged by war. The Treaty of Versailles, as well as requiring Germany to pay reparations, provided a general outline of an iron and steel project, which would have left France the dominant power in Europe.1 However, if these clauses were not to become a dead letter, Germany would have to collaborate in their implementation, either voluntarily or under compulsion by the Allies or by France alone. But in view of its weakness France could scarcely act alone with much chance of success. This was illustrated during the occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, and it points to one of France’s fundamental weaknesses, namely its financial condition, which seldom receives careful attention even though at crucial moments it was almost certainly the decisive factor undermining French foreign policy. Yet the determination with which Raymond Poincaré, during his two governments in 1922-4 and 1926-9, pursued the objectives set down by the ministry of finance in 1919, seems finally to have borne fruit in the summer of 1929. Was it a success or merely a Pyrrhic victory? This is the question that shall be addressed in the present chapter.
