ABSTRACT
Shock is something which forms part of a recognisable train of events associated with the death of a close relative or loved one. Such reactions also encompass anxiety, rage, acceptance and mourning. But sudden and unexpected death, especially in very public circumstances, amplifies the response. What distinguishes grief from remorse and disappointment from shame is not simply a determinate inner feeling but responses, actions, appraisals and situations in the social world.1 As Jane Littlewood has recently observed on the social and emotional sequelae of mass death: ‘Bereavement by disaster seems to intensify the features of grief associated with unexpected violent deaths in general, and, under these circumstances, it would be expected that there would be an increased risk of poor outcome following such bereavements.’2 For many centuries it was not recognised that the fear surrounding an accident or injury, and the subsequent emotional reaction, could cause a person to become ill.3 Anger and resentment and their juridical counterparts of retribution and reparation have been recognised and sanctioned variously in the Code of Hammurabi, the Old Testament, the Roman law of retaliation-or lex talionis-and other systems, including that of trial by battle.4 Whilst these have been largely superseded, it is only in the relatively recent past that English law has been prepared seriously to entertain claims in respect of the emotional losses suffered by those whose relatives have been killed by others.
