ABSTRACT
Let me begin by reviewing my stance on so called ‘indispensability arguments’ – arguments from the indispensability of a belief to its truth, or to its warranted assertability (often it is unclear which is being argued to).
Pragmatism tells us that we have to take seriously the beliefs that we find indispensable in our lives. That doesn't mean that we must always retain such beliefs unaltered. If there is a devastating criticism of a belief that has been fundamental to our practice up to now, then we must alter the belief (and that usually means altering the practice as well). But if every philosophical ‘refutation’ of such a belief proves, on examination, much more problematic than the belief – which is what I believe to be the case with all the attacks on the possibility, indeed on the very idea, of rational argument, both in the case of science and the case of ethics, then I go with the pragmatists and say ‘Yes, there is such a thing as rational argument here, yes there is such a thing as an objectively warranted assertion here.’ If there couldn't be objectively warranted judgments of value, then there couldn't be objectively warranted judgments about anything.
