ABSTRACT
This chapter examines the relationship between surveillance and the illiberal state. It investigates whether illiberal democracies are more prone to rely on surveillance strategies than liberal democracies to advance their political agendas, and what specific advantages surveillance strategies offer to illiberal states. It argues that illiberal democracies are no more likely to possess or use surveillance capabilities than liberal democracies, but what is relevant is how respective governments choose to deploy their surveillance strategies. The diminished political freedoms characteristic of illiberal states translates to a far greater likelihood of surveillance abuse by these governments. Surveillance restrictions offer three principal advantages to illiberal governments: tracking individuals who represent political threats to the regime; using mass surveillance techniques to monitor large swaths of the population; and gathering mass information about public sentiment and grievances to enable proactive coercion and manipulation strategies. The chapter begins by providing a definitional and theoretical framework for surveillance. It examines incentives by illiberal regimes to carry out surveillance measures and presents an empirical analysis of surveillance trends across illiberal and liberal democracies. It discusses the relevance of China’s surveillance model for illiberal states and examines the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on global surveillance patterns.
