ABSTRACT
This chapter shows that the theory of illiberal democracy, far from being contradictory or incoherent, actually makes sense. Once we disentangle liberalism and democracy, and leave behind the liberal appropriation of all that is democratic, it becomes clear that illiberal democracy is actually more true to democracy’s roots. Pure popular sovereignty cannot be encumbered by the rule of law, the separation of powers, and the protection of individual human rights. This is why our preferred form of democracy has always been liberal democracy, that is, a democracy limited and checked by legal and constitutional safeguards. This is also why illiberals around the globe reject it. In order to demonstrate this, the chapter discusses illiberal democracy’s intellectual history, drawing on Jacob Talmon’s account of the Jacobin revolutionary government, Alexis de Tocqueville’s and Benjamin Constant’s description of the plebiscitarian rule of the two Napoléons, Max Weber’s model of a charismatic leader and Carl Schmitt’s defense of dictatorship. Out of the writings examined, this chapter then distils a model illiberal democratic constitution able to explain current illiberal governments’ constitutional moves.
