ABSTRACT

RoN is conceptually related to the issue of legal personhood and agency. The idea is that legal personhood, which provides the basis for ascribing legal rights, can be independent of the philosophical concept of personhood. Thus, to understand the concept of agency, one has to assess whether an individual or a collective meets the criteria of an active and deliberative entity that is capable of acting according to norms. Corrigan attempts to provide a rough sketch as to how the people can divide up nature and identify particular right-holders. However, it will not provide a definitive reason for adopting and implementing legal RoN, because legal rights involve numerous practical considerations that moral rights do not. Sajeva discusses biocultural rights, which offer a hybrid between (indigenous) human rights and RoN, while Corrigan considers the potential for a supporting relation between RoN and human rights and how this might be developed to offer a justification for RoN.