ABSTRACT
Kendall Walton explains pictures in terms of games of perceptual make-believe. Pictures or depictions are props that draw us to participate in games of make-believe where we imagine seeing what a picture depicts. Walton proposes that one imagines of one’s perceptual experience of the coloured canvas that it is a different perceptual experience. The issue is whether perception and imagination can combine the way Walton suggests. Can one imagine a perception to be different? To get a clearer understanding of the unified perceptual-imaginative experience Walton posits, the chapter turns to competing theories that explain perceptual experience in terms of contents, relations to objects, or both contents and relations. Walton appeals to theories of perceptual content and cognitive penetration. But it is also important to examine whether his view fits with recent theories that explain perception only in terms of relations or in terms of both contents and relations. The chapter argues that Walton’s view is compatible with content theories of perception and can be defended from some objections once we look at the detail these theories offer. Walton’s view is not compatible with pure relational theories of perception, but it can be explained by hybrid content-relational theories of perception that posit de re senses.
