ABSTRACT
Russia’s more comprehensive information warfare concept is arguably a continuation of long-running Russian strategic thought and historical military doctrines that have been adapted to the cyber domain. The First Chechen War exposed substantial failings in Russia’s military doctrine, organizational structure, and strategy. Official Russian assessments of the conflict focused on the advantage the separatists gained through their employment of information warfare. Russian military and security services, bruised by the failure to counter Chechen use of information warfare, adapted relatively quickly in the three years interim before the start of the Second Chechen War. Lessons learned from the Chechen wars were incorporated into Russia’s 2000 Information Security Doctrine. In the Russian leadership’s view, the Color Revolutions were a component of Western information warfare intended to isolate and undermine Russia’s strategic interests within the region. Russian information warfare campaigns targeting the near abroad take the form of opportunistic reflexive control, with a specific focus on the fomenting of political and ethnic tensions.
