ABSTRACT
“Shaming” refers to a set of strategies mobilized by international actors in order to obtain that states honor their international obligations, notably with regards to environmental protection. This behavior speaks to the anarchical structure of the international system, which lacks a centralized political authority. The targets of shaming strategies have included states and multinational business and corporations. Conceptually, “shaming” has been analyzed through both rationalist and constructivist accounts of international politics. Rationalist explanations focus on the material effects of shaming strategies, whether on their costs to actors who are shamed or on their benefits to international cooperation. However, insofar as it involves complying with normative behavior, shaming beckons constructivist accounts that emphasize the intrinsic power of norms. Shaming enters into the neoliberal institutionalist analysis of cooperation as a corollary to the interest-based analysis of reputation and the effect of the shadow of the future upon interstate interactions.
