ABSTRACT
From 2012 onwards, the introduction of the ‘Spitzenkandidaten’ process was intended to present a direct link between the outcome of the European Elections, the winning party in the EP and the next European Commission President. Introducing this procedure has been coined a ‘constitutional coup’ by the European Parliament allowing it to de facto select the Commission President and sidelining Member States in the European Council. The chapter focuses on the overarching question of how and why the European Parliament pushed again for the ‘Spitzenkandidaten’ process in the European elections in 2019 and, eventually, negated the process after the elections. To this end, the chapter looks into the institutionalization of informal rules that gradually led to the confirmation of the Spitzenkandidaten process in 2018/2019, and shows how this informal practice aimed at further strengthening the role of the European Parliament in the selection of the Commission President, culminating in the attempt to outweigh the institutional power of the European Council. However, the chapter also explains why it was not possible for the European Parliament to maintain the Spitzenkandidaten procedure once its collective interests were overtaken by interests of individual MEPs and parties in the aftermath of the European elections.
