ABSTRACT
Interestingly and perhaps ironically, determining both the philosophical content and the specific philosophers falling under a label such as “analytical philosophy of history” arises only when contemplating how this label might apply retrospectively, i.e. historically. For prior to the publication in 1965 of Arthur Danto’s classic book with this title, references abound in the philosophical literature to “philosophical analysis” but not to “analytical philosophy of history.” Then as now, no univocal characterization exists of analytical philosophy. As the term applies to debates about explanation in historiography and theory of history, it has become commonplace to identify Carl Hempel’s 1942 paper, “The Function of General Laws in History,” as the defining template for what analytical philosophy of history is. A primary reason for this concerns the impact of Hempel’s model in generally shaping the emerging subfields of scientific explanation specifically and philosophy of science more generally. For scientific knowledge, however understood, has been the epistemic standard against which history has regularly been measured and typically found wanting. However, this understanding fails to realign with post-Kuhnian accounts of how natural science and history interrelate. From a broadened philosophical and historical perspective, the Hempelian model loses its authority to demarcate what qualifies as a scientific explanation or even as a science. This, in turn, requires rethinking what analytical philosophy offers theory of history. The chapter sketches a broader conception of a logic of explanation within an analytical perspective than has hitherto been appreciated.
